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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COVID-19, COURTS, AND THE “REALITIES OF PRISON
ADMINISTRATION” PART II: THE REALITIES OF LITIGATION
CHAD FLANDERS*
ABSTRACT
Lawsuits challenging prisons and jails for not doing enough to stop the
spread of COVID-19 among inmates have faced mixed results in the courts: wins
at the district court level are almost always followed by losses (in the form of
stays of any orders to improve conditions) at the appeals court level or at the
Supreme Court. This short Article tries to explain why this is happening and
makes three comparisons between how district courts and appeals courts have
analyzed these lawsuits. First, district courts and appeals courts tend to
emphasize different facts in their decisions. District courts focus more on the
severity of COVID-19 and the heightened risk of its spread in correctional
facilities; appeals courts tend to emphasize the enormous managerial problems
correctional officials face in the day-to-day running of prisons during a rampant
and hard-to-control pandemic. Second, when it comes to the constitutional test
of whether correctional officials have shown “deliberate indifference” to the
spread of COVID-19 in prisons and jails, district courts look more at the
objective harm suffered by inmates, where appeals courts fix on the lack of
subjective culpability on the part of correctional officials. Finally, and most
fundamentally, district courts seem to work with a picture that prioritizes
constitutional standards for prisons and jails—about which judges are the
experts—while appeals courts frame their opinions with an eye to the expertise
of those who have the job of running prisons and jails and deferring to them.
The Article concludes by positing that real reform at the level of prison
management is more likely to come from the legislative and executive branches
than as the result of court orders.

* Thanks to Fred Rottnek to conversations and guidance, and to Preethi Raja for excellent and
timely research assistance. This draft was substantially completed before the appearance of
Brandon L. Garrett and Lee Kovarsky’s excellent paper Viral Injustice. I agree with their
conclusion that “judicial intervention” in cases involving COVID-19 in prisons “was quite scarce,
too slow, and extremely deferential.” Brandon L. Garrett & Lee Kovarsky, Viral Injustice, CALIF.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
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I. INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 has ravaged the United States, and almost nowhere else has this
been felt more acutely than in the nation’s prisons and jails. 1 One retired
corrections official characterized the situation in prisons as like the one facing
the passengers in a cruise ship: the perfect “petri dish” for the spread of the
disease. 2 Indeed, the situation seemed far worse for those in jails and prisons
compared to those stuck on cruise ships, especially during the early days of the
pandemic. Those incarcerated in crowded prisons and jails could not socially
distance at all, could not get adequate protective equipment, and were not
furnished with hygiene products; officials in prison also could not, or did not,
follow the recommended guidelines for preventing the spread of COVID-19. 3
Worse, jails and prisons are not self-contained, and staff, administrators, and
released inmates could easily spread COVID-19 into the general population. 4
The outbreak of COVID-19 in prisons and jails is not all that surprising.
Conditions in jails and prisons have always been bad: they were filthy, crowded
places before the pandemic, and they were that way after the pandemic as well. 5
If anything, COVID-19 put a spotlight on the ongoing outrage that is the
American penal system. 6 But some were hopeful at least that this time, the
response might be different: that government officials and the general population

1. Roni Caryn Rabin, Prisons Are Covid-19 Hotbeds. When Should Inmates Get the
Vaccine?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/health/coronavirusvaccine-prisons.html (“People held in confinement are uniquely vulnerable to the virus.”). See
generally CRYSTAL WATSON ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON COVID-19 & CRIM. JUST., COVID-19
AND THE US CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: EVIDENCE FOR PUBLIC HEALTH MEASURES TO REDUCE
RISK 1, 11 (2020) (discussing the disparate impact of COVID-19 on those in the criminal justice
system as unique factors that facilitate the rapid spread of respiratory infections). For an excellent
overview, to which I am much indebted, see Sharon Dolovich, Mass Incarceration, Meet COVID19, THE UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Nov. 16, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020
/11/16/covid-dolovich/.
2. Chris Francescani & Luke Barr, Fearing Outbreaks and Riots, Nation’s Prison and Jail
Wardens Scramble to Respond to Coronavirus Threat, ABC NEWS (Mar. 19, 2020, 10:55 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/fearing-outbreaks-riots-nations-prison-jail-wardens-scramble/
story?id=69676840 (quotation marks omitted).
3. See Dolovich, supra note 1.
4. Chad Flanders, Treat Prisoners with Dignity, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Apr. 7, 2020,
11:00 PM), https://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/2020/04/08/Treat-prisoners-with-dignity/sto
ries/202004080032; Maney v. Brown, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1199 (D. Or. 2020) (“Prisons are more
dangerous than other congregate settings, like cruise ships, because they are not closed systems,
and staff and visitors travel from the facilities back to their homes.”) (quotation marks omitted).
5. See Flanders, supra note 4 (noting the general acceptance of filth and unsanitariness in
prisons, conditions that existed even before the pandemic).
6. See Chad Flanders, Do Prisoners Have a Right to Soap?, NULR OF NOTE (June 24, 2020),
https://blog.northwesternlaw.review/?p=1495 (detailing how the pandemic has brought more
attention to the issue of incarcerated individuals’ lack of access to basic hygiene products).
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would see the need to act quickly to prevent prisons and jails from becoming
“super-spreader” locations.
This Article focuses on one means that various parties have used to try to
improve prison and jail conditions in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and
to force change when it was not immediately forthcoming: class-action
litigation. 7 While some prosecutors and other government officials have
(admirably) taken proactive measures to reduce the risk of a COVID-19
outbreak within jail and prison walls, not all of them have, and some of those
efforts have been halting and half-hearted. 8 Accordingly, lawsuits have been
filed to force the change that has not been coming, or coming only grudgingly,
from correctional institutions. 9 Those suits ask that prisoners be released, or
transferred to safer prisons; they ask that inmates be socially distanced, be given
soap, and that prison officials themselves follow the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) guidelines; they ask that facilities be cleaned and that
they stay clean. 10 The lawsuits have been based, when possible, on visits to the
prisons by various experts, who interview inmates, guards, and wardens. 11
Behind these lawsuits is the constitutional requirement that conditions in prisons
cannot amount to “cruel and unusual punishment[].” 12
Even in the early phases of the COVID-19 litigation, it was possible to
discern a familiar pattern to the litigation: plaintiffs would win victories in the
form of injunctive relief at the district level, but then, almost automatically, the
appeals court (including the Supreme Court, in some cases) would stay that
injunction, putting a pause on any change the prison would have to make. This
pattern has asserted itself again and again, with some variation, across the

7. See, e.g., Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse: Special Collection, UNIV. OF MICH. L.
SCH., https://clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=62 (last visited Mar. 16, 2021)
(providing a database tracking all COVID-19 class-action litigation).
8. Chad Flanders & Stephen Galoob, Progressive Prosecution in a Pandemic, 110 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 685, 686, 697 (2020) (discussing how “these changes were not universal, nor
were they uniformly adopted”).
9. See State Advocacy News: Reform Responses to COVID-19, THE SENT’G PROJECT (Apr.
6, 2020), https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/state-advocacy-news-reform-responses-covid19/ (detailing the efforts of state and local advocates to push for institutional changes to combat
COVID-19 in the criminal justice system).
10. See, e.g., Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1086 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Among other
deficiencies, the class action complaint alleged that the inmates . . . did not have enough soap or
towels to wash their hands properly, waited days for medical attention, were ‘denied basic hygienic
supplies’ like laundry detergent and cleaning materials, and were forced to sleep only two feet
apart.”).
11. See, e.g., id. at 1089 (discussing how a district court used an expert report on a prison
facility to inform its decision-making).
12. See, e.g., id. at 1088 (detailing the prisoner-plaintiffs’ contention that their Eighth
Amendment rights were violated) (quotation marks omitted).
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country. 13 Nor can this difference be chalked up to district courts getting it right
and appeals courts getting it wrong or vice versa. The gap between them is more
complicated, and it requires looking at the dialogue between the district courts
and appeals courts across three levels.
The first level simply deals with the facts themselves, and which ones to
emphasize, and how—at least as an initial matter—important any set of facts is.
The different ways that appeals courts and district courts see the facts are the
subject of Part II of this Article. District courts and courts of appeals seem to
agree on many of the most basic facts about COVID-19, but not on all. Even
when they agree on the facts, they differ on why those facts matter.
This gets us to the second level, or the level of legal argument, where at least
some of the difference in emphasis matters. It is the legal arguments where,
perhaps most obviously, the district courts and the courts of appeals get their
different impressions of the facts; they are looking for different things because
their understanding of the law primes them to look in different places. The
district courts seem to focus most of their attention on the risks of prisoners
getting sick and dying of COVID-19. But the appeals courts, by contrast, seem
more impressed with the difficulties of prison administration. Their differing
understandings of what the law requires leads them to find some facts more
salient than others. The legal analysis of the facts of COVID-19 in prisons and
jails is covered in Part III of this Article.
But at a higher level still, we can see differences between the district and
appeals courts, at the level almost of philosophy. Philosophy informs the courts’
view of the law even if it is not fully articulated, so the legal arguments will in
some way, if only implicitly, be part of a larger philosophical argument about
the nature of prisons and jails and their relationship to the judicial system. It is
at this level that we might fully appreciate the differences that exist between the
district courts and the courts of appeals. Part IV of this Article attempts to
articulate those contrasting philosophies.
II. INTERPRETING THE FACTS OF COVID-19
All district courts begin their decisions on COVID-19 in prison with the
simple fact of the enormous and unprecedented nature of the COVID-19
pandemic, even when the facts acknowledged are depressingly familiar. 14 From
the beginning, the district courts and the appeals courts diverge because the
enormity of the pandemic cuts in at least two ways: one way emphasizes the
lethality of the virus, the other its unpredictability. 15 One way focuses on the
13. Dolovich, supra note 1 (summarizing the recent course of prison class-action litigation
involving COVID-19 related complaints).
14. See, e.g., Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 2020).
15. Compare, e.g., Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 693 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (noting that
the district court heavily considered the importance of preventing severe illness and death), with
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deaths and the illness that we know have happened and will happen; the other
focuses instead on how much we do not know, how unprepared we were, and
how many contingencies there are in dealing with COVID-19.
Start with the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic is indeed serious and how
this basic fact gets refracted in district court opinions regarding prison
conditions. For the COVID-19 virus, as we have come to understand its nature,
presents a special danger because it is transmitted so easily. We can get it simply
by being in groups of people and breathing their air. 16 Accordingly, we should
take measures to distance ourselves from people, and when we cannot do this
entirely, we have to wear masks or other protective equipment, wash our hands,
and keep our spaces clean.
But all of this, the district courts almost universally go on to explain, is more
difficult when trying to control the spread of the virus in correctional
institutions. 17 In the best of times, prisons and jails are not clean, have mold and
dirt, insects and rats. 18 They are also overcrowded, with prisoners sharing rooms
meant to house far fewer people. 19 These are conditions where COVID-19 can
flourish. 20 Prisons and jails, in short, were never good at providing reasonably
hygienic conditions for their inmates, and COVID-19 seemed to hit them exactly
where they were most vulnerable. 21
A final fact that district courts emphasize are the types of people that prisons
house. Many of them are elderly. 22 Many of them have medical issues, either
ones that they had before entering prison, or ones acquired after being housed in
a prison. 23 And this, as we all now know, makes things even more deadly when
it comes to COVID-19. 24 Relatedly, medical care in jails and prisons tends to be

Swain, 958 F.3d at 1090 (noting that the appellate court found that an injunction improperly
prevents officials from responding to rapidly changing circumstances).
16. See Ahlman, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 679 (discussing the contagious nature of the COVID-19
virus and social distancing orders).
17. Id. (detailing how COVID-19 is “particularly dangerous in jails and prisons”).
18. E.g., Dolovich, supra note 1 (discussing insects and rodents); Mark Shenefelt, Maggots,
Mold and Dirt Reported in Weber Jail Food, STANDARD-EXAM’R (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.stan
dard.net/police-fire/maggots-mold-and-dirt-reported-in-weber-jail-food/article_afb664ca-fa8b57e6-ba4f-909ecc8d8b18.html (discussing insects, mold, and dirt).
19. Dolovich, supra note 1.
20. See id. (detailing how social distancing and proper hygiene—both measures recommended
to prevent COVID-19 transmission—are almost impossible to achieve in prisons and jails).
21. Id. (“Carceral institutions are simply not conducive to limiting the spread of a highly
contagious airborne virus.”).
22. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, No. 4:20-CV-1115, 2020 WL 5797881, at *4 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 29, 2020).
23. See, e.g., id.
24. Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 679 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“COVID-19 is particularly
dangerous to people who are older or have certain health conditions and disabilities, including
diabetes, lung disease, heart disease, and compromised immune systems.”).
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less than ideal. 25 Thus, when COVID-19 hit prisons, it hit a population that was
not only more likely to get sick, but also more likely to receive inadequate care.
But do appeals courts disagree with any of the above when they rule against
the district courts? They do not deny that the possibility of an outbreak in prison
is real and that prisons house vulnerable populations who are more likely to get
sick and more likely to die. 26 Appeals courts, no less than district courts, will
start their rulings with what can seem to be almost boilerplate language about
the pandemic and its seriousness. But from there, the emphasis will shift in two
notable ways.
The first is that where district courts will emphasize how serious and indeed
overwhelming the COVID-19 crisis is, the appeals courts will instead focus on
how unpredictable, how changing, the nature of the pandemic is. 27 This relates
to the second shift of emphasis: whereas the district courts highlighted how
prisons and jails were in many ways uniquely suited to the easy spread of
COVID-19, appeals courts will hit at something else about prisons; in particular,
how hard they are to manage, how under-resourced they are, how difficult it is
to deal with large numbers of people, and, relatedly, how little courts know about
what to do in these situations. 28 Appeals courts will emphasize the need for
“flexibility” in how prisons respond to the virus. 29 The phrase “perfect storm”
has been used more than once by appeals courts to describe the spread of
COVID-19 in penal institutions. 30 Appeals courts, more than district courts, are

25. Beth Schwartzapfel, How Bad Is Prison Care? Depends on Who’s Watching, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Feb. 26, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/02/25/how-bad-is-prisonhealth-care-depends-on-who-s-watching.
26. Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating that the court did “not
dismiss the risk of harm that COVID-19 poses to everyone, including the inmates . . . .”).
27. Id. (emphasizing the need of prison officials to act “with dispatch” so they can “respond
to this unprecedented pandemic” and “rapidly evolving circumstances”).
28. District courts note this point as well, but almost always qualify it. See, e.g., Mays v. Dart,
453 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1083–84 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“Operating the Jail, even under normal
circumstances, is a very challenging task that occupies a large, full-time staff of policymakers,
subject matter experts, and front-line correctional officers, medical and mental health workers,
counselors, and others. And these are not normal circumstances.”). But see id. (“This does not
mean, however, that constitutional protections fall by the wayside.”). The appeals court in Mays
nonetheless faulted the district court for not taking the job of the corrections officials seriously
enough. See Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 821 (7th Cir. 2020) (district court did not discuss “in a
meaningful way” the considerable deference owed to prison officials).
29. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Perhaps especially in the prison
context, government officials have a keen interest in maintaining the necessary flexibility to react
quickly in response to new information about the virus.”).
30. Id. at 1289 (“We simply cannot conclude that, when faced with a perfect storm of a
contagious virus and the space constraints inherent in a correctional facility, the defendants here
acted unreasonably by ‘doing their best.’”); Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 158 (5th Cir. 2020).
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impressed with just how hard it is to deal with COVID-19, for everyone, of
course, but for prisons and jails especially. 31
III. APPLYING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT IN PRISON
The different ways district courts and appeals courts address this issue can
be attributed to the fact that they look at things from different points of view. To
put it crudely, but mostly accurately, the district courts are looking at things from
the point of view of the inmate, particularly the inmate who has high
susceptibility to COVID-19. From this point of view, the real problem is that
this prisoner could get sick, and possibly die, from COVID-19. Appellate courts,
by contrast, are looking at things from the perspective of prison administration
and the people who are charged with the challenging day-to-day management of
the prison. From this point of view, what COVID-19 represents is not, in the
first instance, a medical problem—as it is for those who are incarcerated—but a
problem of prison administration and a very difficult one at that.
This difference in perspective is formed by two things. The first is that
district court judges are required to collect and look closely at the testimony
provided by the plaintiffs about prison conditions and about health risks; 32 they
will hear also from medical experts on the dangers of not taking effective steps
to combat the spread of COVID-19. This will take place over days. 33 The judge
will also hear from prison officials, but for obvious reasons, this testimony may
be less engaging and will invariably be self-serving. Overall, district court
judges may be more impressed by the magnitude and the urgency of the problem
of COVID-19 rather than the inability of prison administrators to deal with it.
Or rather, they may be impressed by the urgency of the problem even more
because prison administrators have not been able to get an effective handle on
it. The second and more elaborate reason for the difference in perspective is how
district courts and appellate courts interpret the relevant legal standards, a point
which will require much more discussion.
A.

The “Deliberate Indifference” Standard

The challenges brought by plaintiffs against correctional facilities raise any
number of legal challenges, but the main one—the one which seems to draw all
31. See, e.g., Swain, 961 F.3d at 1280 (“[P]rison officials are faced with the unenviable (and
often thankless) task of maintaining institutional order and security while simultaneously taking
proper care of the individuals in their custody.”).
32. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, No. 4:20-CV-1115, 2020 WL 5797881, at *2–23 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 29, 2020) (providing an extensive “Findings of Fact” section representing 155 separate
findings based on evidence including inmate testimony).
33. For an example of this, though not in the context of COVID-19, see Atkins v. Parker, 972
F.3d 734, 739 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that it was appealing to the district court’s factual findings
as the “district court presided over a four-day bench trial in this case (and we have not).”). One
COVID-19 class action suit had an 18-day trial. See Valentine, 2020 WL 5797881, at *29.
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the other claims under it—is that COVID-19 in prisons and jails and the lack of
an adequate administrative response amounts to cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Constitution. 34 The legal analysis of whether prison conditions
amount to cruel and unusual punishment consists of two steps. The first step is
that the prison conditions be objectively unreasonable, that is, objectively bad. 35
And at this step there is little disagreement between district courts and appellate
courts; indeed, the defendants usually concede the point. 36 They all agree that
COVID-19 is serious, represents a huge risk to prison populations, and is
especially risky to vulnerable populations who are incarcerated. This should not
be too surprising. After all, it is true. 37
The second step is subjective, meaning that the prison administrators, or
those who had the power to do something about those objectively bad
conditions, responded to them with “deliberate indifference.” 38 Although much
ink has been spilled (and more ink will be spilled, below) on the nature of
deliberate indifference, what deliberate indifference means in the context of
COVID-19 is the disagreement in almost every lawsuit that has been brought.
District courts will mostly find deliberate indifference; 39 they will then be
quickly reversed by appeals courts, who say that the district courts have
misapplied or misunderstood what “deliberate indifference” means. 40 But what
is “deliberate indifference”?
To begin with, a deliberate indifference standard is not one of simple
negligence, even criminal negligence. It is not the fact that corrections officials
failed to act in the way a reasonable correctional official would. They must do
worse than that. They must have acted in a way that showed they consciously
disregarded the nature of the problem: that they were aware of their actions and
34. See, e.g., Valentine, 978 F.3d at 162–65 (providing an extensive analysis of the Eighth
Amendment claims but only “paus[ing] briefly” to dismiss the other claims asserted).
35. Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1088 (11th Cir. 2020).
36. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 455 F. Supp. 3d 308, 321–22 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (“Defendants
do not dispute that COVID-19 poses a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiffs.”); Swain, 961
F.3d at 1285 (stating the test requires proof of objective harm but “defendants seem to agree—
wisely, we think—that the risk of COVID-19 satisfies this requirement.”).
37. See, e.g., Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1131 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“[N]obody
contests the serious risk that COVID-19 poses to all inmates and prison staff.”).
38. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994) (“In a suit such as petitioner’s, insofar as it
seeks injunctive relief to prevent a substantial risk of serious injury from ripening into actual harm,
‘the subjective factor, deliberate indifference, should be determined in light of the prison
authorities’ current attitudes and conduct,’ their attitudes and conduct at the time the suit is brought
and persisting thereafter.”) (emphasis added; citations omitted).
39. E.g., Valentine v. Collier, No. 4:20-CV-1115, 2020 WL 5797881, at *31 (S.D. Tex. Sept.
29, 2020) (finding that “Defendants’ conduct has demonstrated deliberate indifference to Plaintiffs
and the class members’ medical needs by recklessly disregarding obvious and known risks to
inmate health and safety.”).
40. E.g., Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 163 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The district court articulated
the right legal standard but incorrectly applied it.”).
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aware it was not enough. 41 Put this way, it becomes clearer how the deliberate
indifference standard is not objective but subjective. It is more about the attitude
that correctional officials take toward the problem than whether they live up to
a given standard. 42 And when we see the test for deliberate indifference this way,
it is a game changer, at least in the hands of the appeals courts. 43 It means that
the standard is not about meeting any goal, or living up to any set of guidelines,
or even following through on your own advice. It is a matter, more generally, of
whether you have looked at the problem, understood what the problem involves,
and done basically nothing. 44
Thus, when district courts look at rising deaths and infections as showing
“deliberate indifference,” the appeals courts will repeatedly say this is missing
the point. They are right about this, at least to an extent. It certainly would be a
problem if a district court took it as per se evidence of deliberate indifference if
a prison or jail was not able to decrease or even eliminate the spread of infections
or deaths due to COVID-19. 45 The constitutional test does not require certain
results; it requires a certain attitude towards those results; specifically, one that
is not deliberately indifferent to them. 46 Appeals courts are right about this in
another and more ordinary way: sometimes, even when we are trying our
hardest, the spread of COVID-19 can outpace our best efforts. We should not
hold prison administrators to a standard higher than everyone else.
And it would also be a problem if a district court saw the failure to follow
CDC guidelines to the letter as per se evidence of deliberate indifference. 47 The
41. Gantt v. City of Los Angeles, 717 F.3d 702, 708 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Deliberate indifference
is the conscious or reckless disregard of the consequences of one’s acts or omissions. It entails
something more than negligence but is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.”).
42. Valentine, 978 F.3d at 163 (“But the Eighth Amendment inquiry concerns [the prison
officials’] state of mind, not the scope of the injury.”).
43. For a historical overview of the importance of this point, see Sharon Dolovich, Prison
Conditions and the Courts, in THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND ITS FUTURE IN A NEW AGE OF
PUNISHMENT, 133–60 (Meghan J. Ryan & William W. Berry III, eds., 2020).
44. E.g., Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2012) (deliberate indifference
requires a showing “approaching total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare.”).
45. As the Fifth Circuit accused the district court of doing. Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081,
1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (“The district court treated the increase in COVID-19 infections as proof that
the defendants deliberately disregarded an intolerable risk. In doing so, it likely violated the
admonition that resultant harm does not establish a liable state of mind.”). See also Swain v. Junior,
961 F.3d 1276, 1287 (11th Cir. 2020) (“First, and most obviously, the district court erred in relying
on the increased rate of infection.”).
46. Valentine v. Collier, No. 4:20-CV-1115, 2020 WL 5797881, at *29 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29,
2020) (noting that the fact of increased deaths does not mean officials were deliberately indifferent).
47. See, e.g., Ahlman v. Barnes, 445 F. Supp. 3d 671, 691 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (“An institution
that is aware of the CDC Guidelines and able to implement them but fails to do so demonstrates
that it is unwilling to do what it can to abate the risk of the spread of infection. In other words,
failure to comply demonstrates deliberate indifference toward the health and safety of the
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CDC guidelines, however wise, do not dictate what is cruel and unusual. Only
the Constitution can do that. 48 Failing to live up to some objective standard—of
results or of conduct—cannot by itself show deliberate indifference. 49 Maybe
the prison and jail administrators were trying, but the disease was just moving
too fast. Such things happen even outside of the correctional context, and it does
not automatically mean that those trying to deal with the problem were
deliberately indifferent to it. We cannot, as one appeals court put it, let the failure
to live up to some objective metrics mean that the prison or jail was subjectively
indifferent and “collapse” the distinction between objective and subjective. 50
B.

Proving Deliberate Indifference

If district courts repeatedly risk conflating the subjective and the objective,
there is a risk on the other side too: that the appeals courts will dispense with
any kind of standard at all. When the appeals courts examine whether prison
officials and administrators have been deliberately indifferent to the problem of
the spread of COVID-19, they are mainly looking to see whether they have
basically ignored the problem. If they have done anything, this will probably
suffice. They are doing their “best,” as more than one appeals courts will
explain. 51 However, one gets the impression again and again that just throwing
anything at COVID-19 is sufficient, because it shows that the officials are not
willfully ignoring the problem they have in front of them. 52 They are doing
something, and this fact means that they are not reckless; they are not turning to

inmates.”); Wilson v. Williams, 455 F. Supp. 3d 467, 479 (N.D. Ohio 2020), enforcement granted,
No. 4:20-CV-00794, 2020 WL 2542131 (N.D. Ohio 2020), and vacated, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir.
2020) (“Elkton has altogether failed to separate its inmates at least six feet apart, despite clear CDC
guidance for some time that such measures are necessary to stop the spread and save lives.”). For
a recent look at how courts have (or have not) incorporated CDC guidance into their opinions
regarding prison conditions, see Conditions of Confinement, COVID-19, and the CDC, 134 HARV.
L. REV. 2233 (2021).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
49. E.g., Ahlman, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 688, 691.
50. Swain, 958 F.3d at 1089 (“In conducting its deliberate indifference inquiry, the district
court incorrectly collapsed the subjective and objective components.”); Valentine v. Collier, 956
F.3d 797, 802 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he district court thus collapsed the objective and subjective
components of the Eighth Amendment inquiry established in Farmer, treating inadequate measures
as dispositive of the Defendants’ mental state.”).
51. See, e.g., Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1288 (11th Cir. 2020) (“First, with respect to
social distancing in particular, as the court-commissioned expert report summarized, the defendants
‘d[id] their best.’”).
52. Ahlman v. Barnes, No. 20-55568, 2020 WL 3547960, at *9 (9th Cir. June 17, 2020)
(Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]here a prison took steps to mitigate the
risk of infection by increasing internal safety procedures, it could not have consciously ‘disregarded
the risk’ to inmate health and safety, even if the measures sometimes fall short of the CDC
guidelines.”).
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look at the problem that COVID-19 presents and then simply walking away. 53
In one case, it was considered damning to the plaintiffs’ side that one of the
plaintiffs’ attorneys conceded that the jail was trying their “very, very best.” 54
But it is almost certain too that the something that they are doing is not
enough in most every case, even if they are trying very hard; again, we need only
look at the metrics. We can look at the rising case counts and deaths; 55 we can
look at the various CDC recommendations and the prison’s ability to comply; 56
and we can look at the promises that the officials themselves have made and
have not lived up to, or simply never did that much to meet. 57 Appeals courts
can also agree that most officials could have done more. 58 But none of this
ultimately matters, because deliberate indifference is not simply about living up
or down to a standard, it is about whether you are doing something or nothing at
all and whether you are at least not disregarding the problem and instead
addressing it, however imperfectly and however ineffectively. 59 The key thing
is that you are not ignoring it. 60 What would be decisive evidence, on this view,
would be an admission that the administrators themselves believed that what
they were doing was not enough. 61 But that never happens.
53. See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 843 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n official will likely
not be found to be deliberately indifferent if they took some action, even if that action was
inadequate.”).
54. Marlowe v. LeBlanc, 810 F. App’x 302, 305 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Plaintiffs’ own counsel
conceded at the April 7 evidentiary hearing that ‘everyone here is trying their very, very best to
make sure that nobody gets sick at [RCC].’”). For a discussion of Wragg v. Ortiz, 462 F. Supp. 3d.
476 (D. N.J. 2020), see Garrett & Kovarsky, supra author’s note p. 1. Ortiz, 462 F. Supp. at 507
(no Eighth Amendment violation if detention officials “subjectively believe their containment
measures are the best they can do.”).
55. See Garrett & Kovalsky, supra author’s note p. 1.
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., id.
58. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 158 (5th Cir. 2020) (“As judges, our
conscribed role is not to assess whether prison officials could have done more to contain the virus—
no doubt they could have.”).
59. See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 844 (6th Cir. 2020) (“In contrast, here the
BOP has not turned a blind eye or deaf ear to a known problem that would indicate such a lack of
concern for petitioners’ welfare.”).
60. See, e.g., Valentine, 978 F.3d at 164 (“Here, even recognizing that COVID-19 poses a
greater risk than tuberculosis, any argument that TDCJ ‘evince[d] a wanton disregard for any
serious medical needs’ is dispelled by the affirmative steps it took to contain the virus.”).
61. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 802 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Though the district
court cited the Defendants’ general awareness of the dangers posed by COVID-19, it cited no
evidence that they subjectively believe the measures they are taking are inadequate.”); Marlowe v.
LeBlanc, 810 F. App’x 302, 305 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Even assuming that Plaintiffs’ testimony
somehow satisfies Farmer’s objective requirement, the district court cited no evidence establishing
that Defendants subjectively believed that the measures they were (and continue) taking were
inadequate.”); Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (“While perhaps impossible
for the defendants to implement social distancing measures effectively in all situations at Metro
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But to make the officials’ awareness of the problem paramount, and have it
be enough that they are aware of the problem and are doing something—
anything—is to make the subjective part of the deliberate indifference test
swallow up the test entirely. 62 It must still be possible to have it be the case that
officials are aware of the problem and do something about it, but those same
officials were also aware that what they are doing is nowhere near enough. 63
This, for the district courts, could allow them to infer deliberate indifference:
officials are taking steps, sure, but those are steps that they know are not enough
to adequately deal with the problem. A district court is surely within its rights,
moreover, to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of a prison warden who says
that they are “doing all they can” or “doing their very best.”
The problem is that the appeals courts seem to end with the fact that prisons
and jails have done something, and that itself pretty much shows that they cannot
be “indifferent” to the problem. This goes too far too quickly. Taking some
measures to aid prisoners, as Michael Dorf has spelled out, does not rule out that
one is still deliberately indifferent. 64 A prison may have a plan, but the plan may
still show evidence of recklessness if the plan is obviously just not enough. In
other words, a court can both credit what the prison is doing but also find that
what it is doing is knowingly insufficient. And this seems to be what the district
courts are doing in finding subjective indifference. 65
So why do appeals courts reverse district courts on precisely this point?
Here, finally, we get to the legal wrinkle that drives many, if not all, of these
cases, which is that the usual order of deference—the idea that higher courts
West’s current population level, the district court cited no evidence to establish that the defendants
subjectively believed the measures they were taking were inadequate.”).
62. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, No. 4:20-CV-1115, 2020 WL 5797881, at *30 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 29, 2020) (“Designing a policy and implementing some of the measures therein does not
automatically satisfy Defendants’ constitutional obligations, especially in the face of an
unprecedented public health crisis.”).
63. As Justice Sotomayor commented in her opinion on the Valentine case:
The District Court found that respondents “were well aware of the shortcomings” in their
response “and nevertheless chose to stay the course, even after a number of inmates died.”
Respondent Collier even admitted that prison officials “‘were not doing everything [they]
should have been. . . . Thin[g]s like restricting, isolating, PPE access, cleaning supplies.’”
To be sure, the “Eighth Amendment does not mandate perfect implementation,” but it also
does not set a bar so low that any response by officials will satisfy it. Given the evidence in
the record, there is no basis to overturn the District Court’s finding of deliberate
indifference.
Valentine, 141 S. Ct. at 61–62 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
64. Michael Dorf, Deliberate Indifference, DORF ON L. (Aug. 10, 2020), http://www.dorfon
law.org/2020/08/deliberate-indifference.html
65. See, e.g., Seth v. McDonough, 461 F. Supp. 3d 242, 262 (D. Md. 2020) (“Additionally,
although the Court credits that Defendant is responding to a rapidly evolving pandemic and has
improved its response in many ways since the filing of this lawsuit, no formal plan exists to continue
in some orderly fashion, the provision of PPE, cleaning supplies, and social distancing measures.”).
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should defer to lower courts, especially when it comes to factual
determinations 66—just does not exist in the COVID-19 prison cases. 67 In fact, it
gets flipped. 68 It is as if the appeals courts decide to skip a level when looking
at the facts, going past what the district court said and focusing instead on the
correctional officials’ representations of the truth. 69 Correctional officials get the
benefit of the doubt, and appeals courts willingly give them that benefit. 70
District courts and their determinations are no longer treated with the deference
they almost uniformly get in any other factual dispute that is appealed. 71
Moreover, this deference cannot simply be chalked up to legal errors that the
district courts have made. Rather, the deference here goes deeper because it is
not just part of a legal framework. It derives from a larger understanding of the
place of prisons in the legal universe and the relationship of courts to prisons.
Before analyzing that relationship, we should emphasize once more how
consequential the deferential stance of appeals courts is toward prison
administration and administrators, especially if it is the case, as one district court
noted, that “[no] bright line divides a reasonable response from one that is
deliberately indifferent in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” 72 For when we
have evidence of policies announced and then not followed through on, lies by
prison officials, and text and emails that show the officials are more worried

66. See, e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 837 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that abuse of
discretion “is a highly deferential standard, and the ‘district court’s determination will be disturbed
only if the district court relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applied the
governing law, or used an erroneous legal standard.’”) (citations omitted).
67. Or if the appeals court does defer, the Supreme Court acts as a backstop. Compare Ahlman
v. Barnes, No. 20-555682020, 2020 WL 3547960, at *4 (9th Cir. June 17, 2020) (“Defendants have
fallen far short of making a strong showing that the findings here were clearly erroneous.”), with
Barnes v. Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. 2620, 2620 (2020) (granting stay of district court opinion).
68. For an excellent discussion of this phenomena (to which I am indebted), see Dolovitch,
Forms of Deference in Prison Law, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 245, 254–55 (2012). See also Fourteenth
Amendment – Due Process – Eleventh Circuit Holds That a Florida Jail Was Not Deliberately
Indifferent to the Spread of COVID-19, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2622, 2626 (2021) (noting “courts’
sweeping deference to administrators’ perspective on how to manage prison and jail facilities”).
69. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 141 S. Ct. 57, 61 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Rather
than contending with these facts, the Fifth Circuit sidestepped the clear-error standard by claiming
that its review was not ‘fact-specific.’ But the Fifth Circuit’s analysis makes clear that it substituted
its own view of the facts for that of the District Court.”) (citation omitted).
70. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827
(1974)) (“[I]n the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have
exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert
judgment in such matters.”).
71. See, e.g., Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978, 988 (6th Cir. 2020) (Cole, J.,
dissenting) (“It is not generally the role of an appellate court to resolve the discrepancies in the
parties’ factual accounts; that is the district court’s job. We also do not re-weigh the evidence.”);
see also Dolovich, supra note 1, using examples from many of the cases discussed supra.
72. Plata v. Newsom, 445 F.Supp.3d 557, 568 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
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about appearing favorable to the court than stopping the spread of COVID-19, 73
we can make one of two inferences. We could infer that because prison officials
are lying, or being deceptive, and offering inconsistent answers, they are in fact
fully aware of the problem, and of the clear inadequacy of their response. 74 But
there is another inference we could make. We can overlook the occasional
inconsistency or falsehood, and credit the officials for what they say they are
trying to do, rather than what they do, and try to explain away some of their more
glaring contradictions. Either conclusion is, in theory, compatible with the law
and the facts. The appeals court is not wrong in holding that a showing of
deliberate indifference is indeed hard to make. 75 But neither are district courts
wrong in making the legal finding that the seriousness of the problem plus the
failure to take it seriously enough permits an inference of deliberate indifference.
What tips the balance for the appeals courts is a theory of (extreme) deference
to prison officials rather than to district courts, and that is what needs to be teased
out.
IV. COMPETING WORLDVIEWS
I have been contrasting the perspective many district courts have taken on
COVID-19 litigation with that taken by appeals courts. District courts have been
relatively pro-plaintiff. They have ordered prison administrators to do more to
stop the spread of COVID-19. 76 Appeals courts have instead (mostly) sided with
73. For a good example of all these things happening during a single lawsuit, see Valentine v.
Collier, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1165 (S.D. Tex. 2020), rev’d, 993 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2021):
Text messages demonstrating confusion about the methodology behind reporting statistics
including a lack of transparency regarding the methodology behind test results;
modifications to the Pack Unit made just in time for trial in order to “look more favorable”
to this Court; visits to the Pack Unit that were seemingly staged for Defendants’ experts;
the fact that grievances were not dealt with promptly even while the death toll mounted;
and the fact that the overall guidance was not modified for the Pack Unit whatsoever, even
as it continued to be the unit hit the hardest by the pandemic across TDCJ and in spite of its
vulnerable population, have all contributed to the Court’s skepticism that Defendants are in
fact consistently implementing many of the procedures and policies that they claim to be.
74. See, e.g., id. at 1131–34 (listing, in the section on “credibility of defendants,” failures to
disclose COVID-19 test results to the court, dissembling to the court about the accuracy of the
numbers, and the prison’s practice of making changes only right before hearings and in response
to them); see also id. at 1134 (citing instances where the prison misrepresented facts to the court);
Cameron, 815 F. App’x at 986 (plaintiffs alleging that jail only adopted preventative measures in
response to litigation and then discontinued them after a court-ordered inspection); Cameron v.
Bouchard, 462 F. Supp. 3d 746, 776–77 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (describing concerns about credibility
of defendants who had “not been inside the housing areas for weeks before the evidentiary
hearing”), on reconsideration, No. CV 20-10949, 2020 WL 2615740 (E.D. Mich. May 22, 2020),
vacated, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020).
75. See, e.g., Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (“As applied in the prison
context, the deliberate-indifference standard sets an appropriately high bar.”).
76. See, e.g., Valentine, 2020 WL 6704453, at *37–38.
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those administrators and stayed injunctions that required them to do more. 77 But
in trying to tease out two contrasting visions of courts and prisons, we should
caution that such a simple district court/appeals court dichotomy will no longer
do, if it ever did. The two “worldviews,” if we can call them that, are pitched at
the level of philosophy. They do not belong to one level of court or another, or
even to the court system contrasted with the executive or the legislative
branches. They are—as the clumsy term “worldview” suggests—ways of
looking at the world, and the place of courts and prisons in it. The point here is
to take the 100,000-foot view, something we have been slowly building up to.
What are the philosophies within which a certain view of the facts make sense,
and a certain legal framework seems most justified?
A.

The Pro-Inmate Outlook

One of the more philosophically loaded passages in the prisoners’ rights
context is the one from DeShaney v. Winnebago, from which one can glean
much of the pro-prisoner outlook. 78 When incarcerated, prisoners enter into a
position of dependence on the government. 79 As a consequence, the state has a
positive obligation to give them what they need because absent the government,
they have no way to get it: they are behind bars, separated from the market, and
separated from the charity of others. 80 If government does not house them, feed
them, and care for them, they cannot live, let alone stay healthy. 81 As the
government continues to incarcerate people in prisons and jails, the government
therefore has affirmative responsibilities, responsibilities it would not have if it
did not incarcerate at all. The situation is especially precarious when inmates are
confined within the facility’s walls, unable to evade an infectious disease. 82
Spelling out the government’s affirmative obligations to those whom it

77. See, e.g., Barnes v. Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. 2620, 2620 (2020).
78. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (“[W]hen the
State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him
unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—e.g.,
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits
on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.”).
79. Id.
80. See Swain, 961 F.3d at 1295 (citations omitted) (“Because incarceration ‘strip[s]
[detainees] of virtually every means of self-protection and foreclose[s] their access to outside aid,’
the Constitution imposes affirmative obligations on jail officials . . . .”).
81. See Valentine v. Collier, 140 S.Ct. 1598, 1601 (2020) (statement of Sotomayor, J.) (“[I]n
this pandemic, where inmates everywhere have been rendered vulnerable and often powerless to
protect themselves from harm.”).
82. See Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 845 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[P]risoners have been placed
in a deadly predicament: prevented by the fact of their confinement from taking recommended
precautions, they are left exceptionally exposed to a deadly virus. This reality is particularly
concerning for medically vulnerable inmates like those in the subclass.”).
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incarcerates—but one that seems especially salient in the context of COVID19—is one half of the pro-prisoner picture.
The other half is where the courts come in. Their job is to make sure that the
government meets these obligations consistent with the requirements of the
Constitution. 83 Now, those constitutional requirements may not be very
demanding. At the limit, they only require that the government not treat those
whom it incarcerates in a cruel and unusual manner. 84 But those constraints are
not nothing. 85 They drive the government’s responsibility to give prisoners what
they need to live and to protect their health and their well-being. Courts, because
they are the institutions that look after people’s rights, are uniquely situated to
interpret those rights and spell out what the government has to do so prisons are
not cruel and unusual. 86 The government has a higher stake in intervening and
has to give, not stay away, in order to meet its constitutional obligations. 87 Courts
are there to spell out what and how much governments have to give. 88 That is
where courts excel, that is where they are experts. Against this backdrop,
arguments about lack of resources or judicial meddling simply pale. 89

83. See Mays v. Dart, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1074, 1084 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“Government officials in
our country are bound by constitutional requirements even when they are dealing with difficult and
unfamiliar challenges to public health and safety.”).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
85. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (“The Constitution ‘does not mandate
comfortable prisons’ but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and . . . ‘the treatment a prisoner
receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment.’”) (citations omitted).
86. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 492, 511 (2011) (while “[c]ourts must be sensitive to the . . .
need for deference to experienced and expert prison administrators,” they “may not allow
constitutional violations to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion into the
realm of prison administration.”).
87. The distinction was noted by Judge Ellison in a footnote to his decision in Valentine:
Critically, Plaintiffs claim not that the State is infringing upon their constitutional rights to
combat a public health emergency, but rather that the State is infringing upon their
constitutional rights precisely because it is not reasonably combatting a public health
emergency within Pack Unit. Thus, Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights remain protected under
the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard.
Valentine v. Collier, 455 F. Supp. 3d 308, 329 (S.D. Tex. 2020).
88. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1174 (S.D. Tex. 2020), rev’d, 993
F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The injunction may be seen as micro-management of the state’s conduct,
or a burden to the government’s budget, or as assuming a responsibility that should be left for the
legislature. Against all that is the simple proposition that we must not treat with deliberate
indifference those whom we have chosen to imprison.”).
89. See id. at 1176 (“The injunction may be seen as micro-management of the state’s conduct,
or a burden to the government’s budget, or as assuming a responsibility that should be left for the
legislature. Against all that is the simple proposition that we must not treat with deliberate
indifference those whom we have chosen to imprison.”); Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 849
(6th Cir. 2020) (Cole, J., dissenting) (“And even if compliance with the order detracts from other
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The Pro-Administrator Outlook

But we can now consider another contrasting view, one which starts by
emphasizing the culpability of the persons who are incarcerated and the fact that
they are being punished. Punishment is best viewed, not in terms of the
responsibility of the government officials to provide it, but in terms of the
obligations of those who are being punished. Understandably, individuals
suffering from those deprivations do not like it, and prisoner administrators must
deal with that dissatisfaction. Perhaps more to the point, the regulation of
prisoners is not regulation of people who have won awards for being good; they
are being punished for violations of certain laws and are further marginalized
for not following the rules. They are in prison to be separated from society, to
be rehabilitated, and even to suffer and reflect on what they have done. 90 It is
hard work to house large numbers of law-disobeying people in one place,
whatever the various reasons and explanations those who find themselves
incarcerated may have for being there. This is why the prisoner administrators’
task is so often described as “unenviable.” 91
So even in the best of times, this outlook presupposes that prisons are going
to be an administrative nightmare. This is a foundational point for the proadministrator outlook, and just as DeShaney was the key text for the pro-prisoner
view, Procunier v. Martinez provides the basis for the opposite point of view. 92
Courts cannot simply dictate detailed prison procedures from above, as if there
were obvious rules—even constitutional rules—that we could spell out. Courts
are at such a remove from what goes on in prisons, they can hardly sit in expert
judgement on what prisons ought to be doing. Courts, as appeals courts are wont
to say, are not equipped to dabble in the minutiae of prison administration. 93 To

functions, there is no higher and better use of BOP resources than to fulfill its legal and moral
obligation to care for the lives of those in its custody.”).
90. Etienne Benson, Rehabilitate or Punish?, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N: MONITOR ON PSYCH.
(July/Aug. 2003), https://www.apa.org/monitor/julaug03/rehab.
91. See, e.g., Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2020); Spain v. Procunier, 600
F.2d 189, 193 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J.) (prison administrators have the “unenviable task of
keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions”).
92. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989); Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (“[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most
require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government . . . .
[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and
reform. Judicial recognition of that fact reflects no more than a healthy sense of realism.”). See also
Dolovich, supra note 1, at 253.
93. See, e.g., Ahlman v. Barnes, No. 20-55568, 2020 WL 3547960, at *12 (9th Cir. June 17,
2020) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (“Casting aside this admonition, the district court’s injunction wades
into the minutia of prison operations, going so far as to dictate the amount of hand soap and number
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be sure, there may be extreme cases, but they are marked by being extreme. In
the run of the mill cases, where there are prisoner complaints that things are not
going as they should, courts should stay out and defer to what the prison
administrators are saying. It is especially a problem when courts try to
micromanage a problem that is rapidly evolving. 94 Prisons are no place for
constitutional idealism, and courts’ attempts to micromanage them are
“hamstringing” the people on the ground who know better. 95 Here, the worry is
not so much giving prison administrators the power to say what the Eighth
Amendment means (as it is on the pro-prisoner view); rather, the worry is that
shifting power from “public officials” to the “district court” in deciding how
prisons should be run is a recipe for disaster. 96 Courts should not be, nor aspire
to be, “super-wardens,” 97 or, as Justice Thomas put it, the “Constitution charges
federal judges with deciding cases and controversies, not with running state
prisons.” 98 It is this deference to the prison administrator’s administrative
expertise that does not so much trump the constitutional claims of prisoners—
although it arguably does just that—but decisively informs how a court should
look at them.
V. CONCLUSION
Prison administrators, appeals courts will say, should not be blamed for
failing to do the “impossible” in combatting COVID-19. 99 By this, they mean at
least partly much of what has been emphasized throughout this Article: that
running prisons is very hard, even in the best of times, and prison administrators
should be given some leeway in how they manage a rapidly emerging and
changing crisis like COVID-19. But in another sense, the courts are meant to be
taken much more literally. If prisons do not have the resources to follow CDC
guidelines, or if there are legal barriers to doing so, then it simply cannot be
deliberate indifference to fail to do the “impossible.” With resource limitations,
of paper towels available to each prisoner. In effect, the district court seizes the role of prison
management . . . .”).
94. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 803 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The harm to TDCJ is
particularly acute because the district court’s order interferes with the rapidly changing and flexible
system-wide approach that TDCJ has used to respond to the pandemic so far.”).
95. See, e.g., Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1090 (11th Cir. 2020) (“The injunction
hamstrings MDCR officials with years of experience running correctional facilities, and the elected
officials they report to, from acting with dispatch to respond to this unprecedented pandemic. They
cannot respond to the rapidly evolving circumstances on the ground without first seeking “a
permission slip from the district court.”) (citation omitted).
96. See, e.g., id. (“In large measure, the injunction transfers the power to administer the Metro
West facility in the midst of the pandemic from public officials to the district court.”).
97. See id.
98. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 353, 364 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
99. See, e.g., Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Failing to do the
‘impossible’ doesn’t evince indifference, let alone deliberate indifference.”).
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this may not, strictly speaking, be correct. 100 And even with legal barriers, there
is a colorable argument that administrators should not be able to appeal to state
and federal laws as to what is or is not “possible” in order to continue to run and
operate prisons that are cruel and unusual. 101
But at the same time, what counts as legally impossible is a function of what
the courts of appeals say is legally impossible. And this applies to prison release
as much as to other measures designed to reduce the spread of COVID-19 in
prisons and jails. If appeals courts signal that some things are just too hard for
prisons and jails to do and that they will usually credit the testimony of prison
officials over the judgments of district courts, then the appeals courts are actively
shaping what is legally possible and not possible. 102 Indirectly, they will be
setting the standard for what counts as being indifferent in the face of a
pandemic, because if the standard becomes doing something, then most every
prison and jail will meet that standard. The boundaries of the legal
imagination—what is possible and what is impossible—are set by the appeals
courts and ultimately by the Supreme Court, which has consistently taken the
side of prison administrators when the appeals courts do not. 103 District courts
will eventually learn to internalize these standards and stop issuing orders that
they know will be stayed or reversed. 104
What we may see, reflecting back on the response to the COVID-19
pandemic, is that the positive action started from places other than the courts and
100. See, e.g., Finney v. Ark. Bd. Corr., 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974) (“Lack of funds is
not an acceptable excuse for unconstitutional conditions of incarceration. An immediate answer, if
the state cannot otherwise resolve the problem of overcrowding, will be to transfer or release some
inmates.”); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[A] lack of funds allocated
to prisons by the state legislature . . . will not excuse the failure of correctional systems to maintain
a certain minimum level of medical service necessary to avoid the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment.”).
101. See, e.g., Swain, 961 F.3d at 1298 (Martin, J., dissenting) (“If contrary state law obligations
precluded finding deliberate indifference, federal courts would be powerless to enjoin
unconstitutional prison conditions wherever state legislatures act to withhold prison officials’
authority to remedy them. But this cannot be the rule.”).
102. See Dolovich, supra note 1 (“In case after case, appeals courts granted stays of district
court orders on grounds strongly suggesting a general lack of sympathy with plaintiffs’
arguments.”).
103. See an excellent discussion of this in Brandon Garrett, The Supreme Court’s COVID Cases
Show That One Part of the Constitution Gets Extra Special Attention, SLATE MAG (Dec. 17, 2020,
11:37 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/12/supreme-court-covid-cases-elevatedreligion-constitution.html.
104. A good example of this is the recent district court decision in Bevins v. Kauffman, No.
1:20-cv-02012, 2021 WL 322168, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2021) (“While the Court understands
Plaintiff’s legitimate concerns regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, it agrees with the numerous
courts throughout the nation that have concluded that similar allegations do not support a plausible
inference that officials have demonstrated deliberate indifferent to inmates’ Eighth Amendment
rights.”).
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that prisons and jails that wanted to drag their feet, could. Policymakers and
executive branch officials were the drivers in combatting COVID-19, not
lawyers and district court injunctions. 105 Of course, not all lawsuits have been
unsuccessful. And some lawsuits, even if ultimately beaten back, may have
prompted at least short-term change. 106 Even failed lawsuits can be useful in
generating publicity and gathering information. 107 Those things can lead to
changes as well, if only indirectly. But as the latest round of COVID-19 lawsuits
have shown again, prison litigation is hard, and winning is even harder.

105. See, e.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, AMERICAN CONTAGIONS: EPIDEMICS AND THE LAW FROM
SMALLPOX TO COVID-19, at 125 (2020); Kelan Lyons & Kasturi Pananjady, COVID-19 Leads to
More ‘Discretionary Releases’ from Prison, but Advocates Say It’s Not Enough, CT MIRROR (Dec.
23, 2020), https://ctmirror.org/2020/12/23/covid-19-leads-to-more-discretionary-releases-fromprison-but-advocates-say-its-not-enough/. I should also include in here what seems to have been
the major driver of changes: state level action, including state courts and especially orders by state
courts regarding bail and prisoner release. And this goes to a related, but distinct point: that most
of the real change seems to have occurred on a top-down basis, rather than from the bottom up, i.e.,
from litigation.
106. See, e.g., Valentine v. Collier, 455 F. Supp. 3d 308, 323 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (noting that
some measures in response to COVID-19 “were not implemented under after the commencement
of this lawsuit, and some were not adopted until the day before this Court’s evidentiary hearing”).
107. Although the lawsuits may obviously encourage prisons and jails to be less forthcoming
with information, for fear of liability. See, e.g., Barnes v. Ahlman, 140 S. Ct. 2620, 2622 n.1 (2020)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). (“Notably, the Jail has since resisted respondents’ attempts to verify
the Jail’s compliance with the District Court’s preliminary injunction.”).

